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<p>15. Abstract: This paper examines the relevance of redefining an old concept that at one time was common practice in the U.S. Military. Joint Conflict Observer teams are one such concept. They can provide the regional combatant commander and staff with specific information regarding allies, neutrals and belligerents within their theater of operations. These hand-picked teams, organized for a specific task, would provide valuable information and impart lessons learned from observing other countries involved in regional conflicts or as part of the Global War on Terror. This paper examines historical examples that highlight the relevance and importance of modern day observer teams regionally oriented to the commander. Next is an analysis of how these teams could fill the information gap between different military services that conduct operations with foreign militaries, in order to maintain the initiative in the GWOT. Then, the paper identifies the bureaucratic and legal hurdles that will challenge the employment of conflict observer teams in the future. And finally, it offers solutions and suggestions on how to select, train and task organized teams to observe training and conflicts around the globe. This redefined concept will provide the commander and his staff another valuable resource to maintain the initiative in the fight against terrorists, rogue nations and future adversaries. This concept is by no means complete and is intended as a starting point for further research and application.</p>			
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

JOINT CONFLICT OBSERVER TEAMS:
An Old Concept Redefined

By

John W. Nutt
Major, U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

03 February 2003

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Introduction

If our Armed Forces are to be faster, more lethal, and more precise in 2020 than they are today, we must continue to invest in and develop new military capabilities.

Joint Vision 2020¹

It is difficult in this day and age to develop an original concept that will be influential, thought provoking, and ultimately become useful to the regional combatant commander and his staff.* Sometimes, old concepts redefined make the most sense and offer solutions that may not have been thought of in the first place. Joint Conflict Observer Teams (JCOT) are one such concept. They can provide the commander and his staff with specific information regarding allies, neutrals and belligerents within their theater of operations. These hand-picked teams, organized for a specific task, would provide valuable information and impart lessons learned from observing other countries involved in regional conflicts or as part of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

This paper examines the relevance of redefining an old concept that at one time was common practice in the U.S. Military. The concept of observer teams is a timeless tool that has metamorphosed into something that was never intended: Peace Keeping Observers, instead of conflict observers. The focus has changed over the years from observing, analyzing and reporting on new methods of warfare and tactics to fulfilling U.N. observer tasks relating to Peace Operations. The paper examines historical examples that highlight the relevance and importance of modern day observer teams regionally oriented to the combatant commander. Next is an analysis of how these teams could fill the information gap between different military services that conduct operations with foreign militaries, in order to maintain the initiative in the GWOT. Then, the paper identifies the bureaucratic

* The term *commander* throughout this document refers to the regional combatant commander.

and legal hurdles that will challenge the employment of conflict observer teams in the future. And finally, it offers solutions and suggestions on how to select, train and task organize teams to observe training and conflicts around the globe. This redefined concept will provide the commander and his staff another valuable resource to maintain the initiative in the fight against terrorists, rogue nations and future adversaries.

Historical Look

...It is a crime for us not to have some first class men in each of the countries....Staff schools and war colleges are as nothing compared to allopathic doses that one may now get in applied military art by profiting by what is now taking place.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry T. Allen²

The above comments from Lieutenant Colonel Henry T. Allen succinctly state the reason why observers were in Europe at the beginning of World War I. Allen was originally sent to Europe as part of a relief commission with the U.S. Assistant Secretary of War, Henry Breckenridge, to coordinate and assist Americans fleeing Europe. This commission successfully completed its mission repatriating over 125,000 Americans in two months. It was six days later, in a fit of frustration, when he finished his report and wrote the above comments to persuade his superiors to send some experienced senior officers to Europe as observers.³

The use of military teams to observe belligerents, neutrals and allies is as old as warfare itself. At one time, it was common practice for competing nations to provide safe passage and assistance to teams observing conflicts around the world. Allen is just one of many officers that recognized the need to send observers to ongoing conflicts that would eventually impact the United States.

The European powers were some of the first who recognized the importance of observers and used them throughout the continent and abroad. Prussia, in 1861, already known as a leader of a revolution in military affairs, did not hesitate to send officers to observe the U.S. Civil War. The chief of the Prussian Corps of Engineers summoned and dispatched Captain Justus Scheibert to observe the war in America. As an observer, Scheibert was well suited for the job as he possessed many attributes that made an effective observer. “He was observant, possessed the social attributes, intelligent, interested in his profession and a capable writer.”⁴

These characteristics are equally as important today in selecting teams as they were in the 19th Century. Scheibert did not stay long with the Union Army before convincing his superiors that he needed to remain as an observer with the Confederate Army. While there he observed 14 battles and engagements and compiled numerous amounts of information based on his first-hand accounts. For example, he recognized how recruitment, training, transportation, and supply influenced tactics and strategy.⁵ Even though the Prussians did not capitalize on the Civil War tactics as Scheibert recommended, he did provide the Prussian military a glimpse of what future wars would look like during the industrial age.⁶

Many legendary figures who had a significant impact on shaping the U.S. military and civilian culture of the past either served as observers or part of an exchange program. This list includes George McClellan, Richard Dellafield, Douglas Macarthur, Billy Mitchell, Joe Stillwell, George C. Marshall, and Claire Lee Chenault.⁷ A more complete list of American observers can be found in a technical report published by the Defense Technical Information Center. This document, painstakingly researched by Major Thomas S. Grodecki, includes the list of 2,000 United States Military Academy graduates who had

served as observers from 1802 through 1975.⁸ Grodecki divides the period between 1802 and 1975 into five categories and chronologically depicts each period, citing the overall purpose of each mission – an aspect which is important in understanding how observers have evolved since 1815 (see figure 1).

Figure 1. Development of Military Observers: 1815-1972

ERA	PERIOD	MISSION FOCUS
1	1815-1865	Observers focused on Europe for military professionalism
2	1865-1885	Observers sought answers abroad to pressing army issues
3	1885-1919	Concentrated upon Prussian Army for lessons learned. Established MID* to control attachés.
4	1919-1941	Attachés focused on intelligence. Observers on professional development. Diplomatic roles to verify compliance of treaties, elections and conferences.
5	1941-1972	Attachés and observers expanded roles to include, KMAG, JUSMMT, and MACV†

Source: Major Thomas Grodecki, *Military Observers 1815-1975*, (Alexandria: Defense Technical Information Center, 1988)

It is important to note the third and fourth eras when the focus shifted toward better intelligence and the need to place permanent observers abroad. This change in mission created the military attaché and expanded the roles of observers.

The historical examples above have primarily focused on Army observers. However, one of the most famous fighting units of World War II was created by a U.S. Marine Corps officer who had served in China as an observer in 1937. This elite Marine unit was formed at the insistence of Lieutenant Colonel Evans R. Carlson who had seen first hand the success of the Chinese (Communist) Eighth Route Army while fighting the

* Because of the need to permanently assign observers overseas the U.S. Army established the Military Information Division (MID) in 1885.

† Military observation as part of assistance and advise missions included Korean Military Assistance Group, Joint U.S. Military Missions for Turkey, and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam.

Japanese. His experience with the “Peoples Army” gave him new insight on how to train, lead and motivate subordinates.⁹ In 1942, Carlson with the help of the President’s son, Captain James Roosevelt, formed the famous Marine Raider Battalions of WWII.

Analysis

Future Relevance

In 1855, the U.S. Secretary of War Jefferson Davis looked toward Europe for solutions to the Army’s problems of territorial expansion and advancements in technology.¹⁰ During the past 150 years the balance of military global power has changed. Europe and the rest of the world now look to the United States as the leader in innovative military technology.

Now in 2003, the United States needs to once again look to Europe and the rest of the world. However, this time the focus of observer teams should not be on technology, but on how our adversaries are adapting and developing asymmetric capabilities that could counter our methods of warfare. The Strategic Context in Joint Vision 2020 highlights three aspects that have significant implications for the U.S. Armed Forces:

***First**, the United States will continue to have global interests and be engaged with a variety of regional actors. **Second**, potential adversaries will have access to the global commercial industrial base and much of the same technology as the US military. **Third**, we should expect potential adversaries to adapt as our capabilities evolve.¹¹*

Our adversaries will continue to plan and wait for the right moment before striking at the United States. They will remain in the shadows and continue to conduct isolated attacks against our allies who have pledged assistance in fighting the Global War on Terrorism. Because of this, our adversaries will often operate in countries that fall outside the national interest of the United States. These are the same countries that may have

regional or border conflicts and do not receive the same attention from the U.S.

Government as Iraq, Israel and North Korea.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), there were over 90 armed conflicts in the world in 2002 that were either international or internal armed conflicts. The IISS further separates these conflicts into three categories: Active, Cease Fire and Peace Accord.¹² Countries that fall into the first two categories would undoubtedly provide the commander with the greatest source of information and therefore, should be considered as potential countries for a JCOT.

However, out of the 90 regional conflicts in 2002, there were only six international armed conflicts involving governments in armed conflict over sovereignty and territory. Additionally, there were 18 internal armed conflicts taking place between government forces and organized groups who control a significant amount of territory within that nation.¹³ Teams deployed to observe an ally involved in either an international or internal conflict could provide an invaluable amount of information relevant to future United States operations.

Joint Conflict Observer Teams offer the combatant commander and his staff a glimpse into the future by satisfying the three statements outlined in the strategic context of Joint Vision 2020. Moreover, since the JCOT will focus on countries that may not be a priority they can provide the commander and his staff with the following information:

Placement and Access: Employing teams in countries that receive dismal support from the United States would improve military to military relations with the host nation. The key to developing this relationship is establishing rapport with both the host nation and the

country team. Inevitably, this would assist the regional combatant commander in establishing future access in countries that may not be a current priority.

Ground Truth: The team would improve the timeliness of information that the U.S. Embassy or Consulate receives during a conflict. These reports could enhance the Military Group's operational knowledge of the conflict and assist in interagency coordination between the U.S. Government (USG), Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs).

Liaisons: Observer teams could serve as the liaison element for advance parties or follow on operations in "neglected" regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa. The JCOT could also serve as the conduit between USG, NGOs and allied nations in support of future operations. This would be a temporary role until a more definitive force could arrive, but would be a viable option since they would already be in place.

Moreover, the U.S. Military would gain a pool of regionally focused officers, knowledgeable of new methods of warfare that have been successful in independent operations. The items above are a starting point in addressing the advantages of creating a JCOT. Lists of advantages are determined by the experience, mission, and capabilities of each team.

As seen throughout history, observer teams can provide their military commanders with innovative ideas, tactics, techniques and procedures that have been used successfully or unsuccessfully by our allies. However, Joint Conflict Observer Teams will never become a reality unless key legal and bureaucratic concerns are addressed.

Legal Considerations

There are two important points that separate the JCOT from other similar operations. First, teams will observe operations overtly. Second, they observe and report under the consent of the nation in which the team is observing. Once this is understood, the commander's legal representatives can proceed in researching what agreements exist between the two countries. Specifically, does a status-of-forces agreement exist with the nation under consideration? The short answer to the question is a resounding maybe. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of countries that the U.S. had permanent status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) with rose from just 40 countries to more than 90.¹⁴ This means that the United States has status-of-forces agreements with almost half of the nations that exist today. These agreements are important because they are the tools that allow the U.S. Department of Defense to carry out its policy directive: "To protect, to the maximum extent possible, the rights of United States personnel who may be subject to criminal trial by foreign courts and imprisonment in foreign prisons."¹⁵ Consequently, the question whether a SOFA exists is an important one and must be answered by the commander's legal representatives.

This is the first step in minimizing the legal hurdles that face the commander and staff. The second step deals specifically with the Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and how they would apply to a JCOT observing either an international or regional conflict. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) is the cornerstone document in which supplemental or mission specific ROE will develop. The SROE is designed to provide guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the inherent right and obligation to self defense.¹⁶ Because of the nature of the mission, a JCOT will

undoubtedly need supplemental or refined ROE for the region in which it will observe.

This provision is outlined in the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff SROE:

The CINCs[sic] may augment these SROE as necessary to reflect changing political and military policies, threats, and missions specific to their areas of responsibility (AORs). When a CINC's [sic] theater-specific ROE modify these SROE, they will be submitted to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for NCA approval, if required, and referenced in Enclosure K of this instruction.¹⁷

Once the legal aspects of the mission are identified and approved, it is imperative that the JCOT undergo rigorous legal pre-deployment training. The following scenarios, at a minimum, should be covered by the Judge Advocate General's office: vehicle accidents (military and civilian), apprehensions by local police, when to return fire and defend host nation military personnel. The concept of placing the JCOT on the ground to acquire new information about how both our allies conduct operations and how the enemy reacts to these operations brings with it the understanding of high risk. This is an *acceptable level* of risk commensurate with a Joint Conflict Observer Team mission.

Another area of concern is the potential bureaucratic web at the State Department. Although the team is working for the combatant commander with clear guidance and specific objectives, the team is operating under and with the consent of the U.S. Ambassador. Even if some countries have only a consulate or a small staff because of ongoing conflicts, coordination is absolutely essential between the embassy and the team. Obviously, the team will coordinate with members of the country team as would any other military unit working in that country. However, much like a Special Operations Team, the foot-print is small, but the coordination between the two elements is vital to the success of the mission.

The U.S. Ambassador is the personal representative of the President of the United States. As a “four star equivalent” the team should be required to report to the embassy for the sole purpose of keeping the ambassador and his staff informed. The senior leader in the military group (MILGROUP) should be the primary point of contact for support and coordination within the embassy.

One way to reduce friction points and misinformation between the country team and the JCOT would be to post a team member at the embassy. This is one method to keep the country team informed and reduce the risk to the team in the field through occasional updates from the embassy regional security officer. Communication and coordination is also vital in reducing potential troubles with the host nation.

Undoubtedly, the nation will ask to review the observer reports as part of the initial agreement or memorandum of understanding between the two nations. This should be considered a legitimate request in return for observations that could lead to mission success or failure. The details of reporting and courtesy copies of reports can be coordinated on the ground between all parties concerned. It is also reasonable to assume that an observer exchange program may take place in the future – another logical request that should be viewed as a way to strengthen ties with a nation that may not be a formal ally. As always, establishing and maintaining rapport with the host nation is the key to providing relevant observations and improved future relationships.

Mission Overlap

As mentioned earlier, the conflict observer team provides overt information that can only be attained by developing a relationship with the host nation’s military. This is done by building rapport and trust with the unit and staff being observed. “Theirs was not a

comfortable existence – they shared the hardships of the army, came under fire and suffered from such illness as dysentery and rheumatic fever.”¹⁸ The knowledge gained is only useful if it is acquired first hand and reported rapidly to the regional staff.^{*} This is not unlike the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) who is also tasked with many of the same requirements. However, the FAO has other responsibilities and is not directly responding to the combatant commander’s requirements. This is also where the JCOT can complement the FAO by not providing the same information to the embassy. It is important to highlight the unique capabilities of both the FAO and a Special Forces operational detachment Alpha (SFODA) in order to identify some potential short falls and misuse of low-density assets.

Foreign Area Officers are regional military specialists that combine military skills with regional expertise, language competency and military-politico awareness.¹⁹ These unique skills enhance the effectiveness of the army when interacting with foreign militaries. His study and regional expertise give him a strong understanding of U.S. policies and interests and how they affect the host nation and region in which he is assigned.[†] Upon completion of language school at the U.S. Defense Language Institute, each officer conducts In Country Training (ICT) to become familiar with the region and the inter-workings of the embassy or military group.

The SFODA, on the other hand, is a unique team consisting of 12 members that possess a broad range of skills. Each team is commanded by a captain with a warrant officer as his second in command. The rest of the team is made up of experienced NCOs,

^{*} Key members of the staff who will benefit the most from the reports is the J2-Intelligence Directorate and the J5-Future Plans and Policy Directorate.

[†] Selected officers are normally assessed and accepted into the program during their sixth year of service.

trained in one of the following military occupational specialties: operations, intelligence, weapons, engineer/demolitions, communications or medicine. The unique skills that highlight this versatile team consist of language qualifications, regional orientation and interpersonal relations. The SFODA is essentially a self-contained team that can conduct sustained operations in austere environments unilaterally or combined.²⁰ This team is a force multiplier when combined with the host nation, surrogate or paramilitary forces.

Both of these forces, the FAO and SFODA bring unique capabilities that provide the combatant commander and the embassy with current information on the host nation and its allies. However, the focus for the SFODA is capturing lessons learned in the form of an after action review in order to improve on their capabilities and limitations. Although the team could be tasked as observers as they have been in the past, it would be a misuse of a low-density asset. Presently, there are not enough teams to meet mission requirements.

A similar case can be made for the FAO. While they are trained to establish and maintain contact with foreign militaries and interface with the leaders on a routine basis, they do not possess the autonomy of the attaché of the past. They are much more valuable as the Army's "Soldier Statesman" rather than an active three or two man element observing a regional conflict. Dispatching a FAO team to observe a regional conflict would also be a misuse of another critical low density asset.

The SFODA, FAO and the JCOT would have unique capabilities that could complement one another when conducting operations with foreign militaries. However, only the JCOT is specifically designed to observe internal and international conflicts providing the combatant commander an unobstructed view - free from bureaucratic shadings. However, the team is doomed to fail if the right personnel are not selected,

trained and given the autonomy to observe and report as they see fit within the given parameters.

Recommendations

The men representing their countries abroad in this capacity were selected for their intellectual promise, their social skills, their tact and, often, their personal wealth and connections, but not necessarily for their language skills.

Maureen P.O'Connor²¹

Observers normally possessed the right set of social attributes that allowed them to move freely among the hierarchy of foreign commands. The same basic qualities of the past are the core traits of the future: timeless attributes. Still, some additional qualities should be considered. Team members however they are selected, should above all be experienced in their profession, comfortable making decisions without immediate guidance, and comfortable in potentially high risk situations.

To determine the best composition for a Joint Conflict Observer Team, the regional combatant commander and staff must first determine the team's purpose. Next, the staff must identify the prerequisite skills necessary for success. Finally, fill the ranks with quality officers and NCOs*.

There would be a natural tendency to rely on SOF and FAOs to fill the ranks of the JCOT which appear to fit the description laid out above. However, the concept is not meant to be SOF, FAO or service exclusive. Rather, the team would be organized in accordance with the mission and tasking from the combatant commander. The team composition would be based on joint requirements rather than represent any one particular service or military occupational specialty.

* JCOT personnel would be recruited based on the tasking and the mission. Officers between the rank of captain (O3) to colonel (O6) and NCOs between the ranks of Staff Sergeant (E6) to (E8) could volunteer.

An ad-hoc team of volunteers, with the right character traits, experienced in the region, trained in basic language skills, communications, reporting, and individual force protection would be necessary for a successful mission. So where are these officers and NCOs to fill this team? The short answer is that they are in the staffs, headquarters and in the line units ready to volunteer. The personnel are available; it is a matter of releasing them from their current duties to fulfill one of the most important assignments in their military career. Once assigned, teams would undergo pre-deployment training of one to three months before assignment to the selected country. The training would be minimal based on the initial selection criteria and the skills inherent to the team.

The actual length of each mission would depend on the mission and tasks developed by the commander and staff. A historical document from the Crimean War, attached in appendix A, provides some insight that is still relevant. The longer the team observes a regional conflict, the better the relationship will become between the observers and the host nation military. One of the goals is to establish a lasting relationship that would eventually lead to the access or placement of U.S. forces in the future. The relationship should be formalized and encouraged to continue long after the teams redeploy. Unfortunately, not a lot of encouragement is placed on officers maintaining a relationship with foreign counterparts during operations or when they attend U.S. Military schools/training. It is left up to the individual to pursue a relationship on his own. This friendship could one day assist the commander in establishing a military presence in a neglected region.

In the Naval War College alone, over 50% of the allied graduates are eventually promoted to the rank of Admiral or otherwise serve in an influential position within their government. Since 1972, a total of 1,405 allies from over 118 countries have graduated

from the Naval Staff College.²² The Army's Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP) involves the reciprocal exchange of personnel between the U.S. Army and foreign military units. Currently there are 13 countries participating in 100 officer and 13 NCO exchanges within the program.²³ Yet, there is no formal plan or oversight that encourages officers and NCOs to continue developing these relationships once formed during training. This means there are a lot of U.S. officers that could be potential candidates for a JCOT mission based on their prior relationship with an allied officer. It is therefore recommended that future JCOT members be required or, at least, directly encouraged to maintain relationships with their counterparts, as this would indirectly support and foster military to military relationships.

Counter Argument

*The experience was without a doubt the most important factor
of preparation in my entire life.*

*Douglas MacArthur, China 1905*²⁴

Some influential writers and leaders in both the military and civilian community may argue against this concept. One of the principal arguments is the personal risk associated with sending a team or any observer group to a region torn in either internal or international strife. Primarily, in order to mitigate the risks associated with such a mission, the legal issues dealing with the SOFA, Memorandums of Agreements, and the supplemental ROE will need to be reviewed in detail. These subjects, already addressed, are meant to be a starting point for further research in ways to mitigate the risk to JCOT volunteers before they deploy and the implications that might stem from observing one nation over another. The personal risk to JCOT teams will be high, but the cost of not maintaining the initiative

against rogue states and terrorists is even more unacceptable. Although the concerns are valid, this is a case where benefits outweigh potential risks.

Another possible argument is that the personnel that have suitable requirements and prerequisite skills necessary for the job are already engaged in ongoing operations. This is true; however, if the commander draws from within and asks for volunteers, the ranks will quickly swell. Any command *can* afford to let two or three of their top notch officers and NCOs participate in a mission that directly supports the regional commanders Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) and ultimately impact the success of future operations.

A final counter-argument concerns the duplication of efforts by all military services and other government agencies. These organizations which include observers from Peace Operations already provide the regional commander with some information on the host nation. However, these forces have a different mission and any information acquired on the host nation conducting operations would only be incidental. Reports from FAOs and SFODAs also provide the commander with in depth knowledge of the region and the host nation's capabilities. Yet, these units are most likely focused on a nation that has already become a national security issue, such as Afghanistan and the Philippines. In addition to these units, a host of other government and nongovernmental agencies provide a wealth of data that the commander can use to stay informed on a particular country.

Although, these organizations complement one another, none is designed to specifically observe internal and international conflicts for the combatant commander. The JCOT, observing with specific guidance, is designed to provide lessons learned on belligerent tactics, techniques and procedures as they occur against our allies and friends. These efforts are not duplicated and remain an innovative way to respond to future threats.

Conclusion

*The instruments of battle are valuable only if one
knows how to use them.*

Ardant Du Picq²⁵

We live in a much different world today than in the past. This is partly due to the rapidity of technological advances throughout the world. Our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy both adjust to meet the global complexities and threats that challenge our nation, allies and friends. As the U.S. military and her allies prosecute the Global War on Terror, we must continue to invest in new concepts and military capabilities. This war is different. Because of this difference, we need to observe and report on conflicts and learn from our allies on how to be more adaptive. There is a need for teams to observe conflicts in the regions we tend to neglect, which are normally not our allies. It is in these countries that new techniques, tactics and procedures will be carried out before attacking the United States directly. However, before observer teams become a reality, the staff must answer two questions in order to determine if this is an appropriate JCOT mission.

First, are there lessons to be learned from either the belligerents, neutrals or our allies? And, second, if the observations reported could lead to successful operations or innovative methods in dealing with global terrorism or future conflicts, does the expected outcome justify the risk? If the answer is yes to both of these questions, then a JCOT is an appropriate choice for the combatant commander.

The adoption and implementation of Joint Conflict Observer Teams can be the tool that allows the U.S. military to maintain an adaptive approach to asymmetric warfare. JCOT observations, coupled with FAO, SOF, Interagency and PKO reports, can create a

solid picture of how the enemy is embracing or defeating technology in pursuing their goals. The focus of the JCOT should be on the neglected regions of the world for this is where our adversaries will develop new capabilities to counter our methods of warfare. Africa is just one of the neglected regions that will provide a safe-haven for terrorist activity and a future test bed for weapons of mass destruction. For these reasons the commander and staff should consider deploying a JCOT to the following countries or areas in conflict: Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Algeria, Kashmir, Israel, Myanmar and Chechnya (Russian Federation).

Despite military discussions that the U.S. has nothing to learn from the *neglected* countries involved in internal or international conflicts, history (Afghanistan) proves that the U.S. will be involved in these types of conflicts in the future. Although these countries may not be vital to our national interests initially, they do possess some of the answers on how to defeat our adversaries in the future. Therefore, a Joint Conflict Observer Team is one of the *instruments of battle* that the combatant commander can use to meet the challenges of twenty-first century warfare.

APPENDIX AThe Orders Establishing and Sending
The Commission

Major R. Delafield
 Major A. Mordecai
 Captain G. B. McClellan
 United States Army

War Department
 Washington,
 April 2, 1855

Gentlemen:

You have been selected to form a commission to visit Europe, for the purpose of obtaining information with regard to the military service in general, and especially the practical working of the changes which have been introduced of late years into the military systems of the principal nations of Europe.

Some of the subjects to which it is particularly desirable to direct your attention may be indicated as follows:

The organization of armies and of the departments for furnishing supplies of all kinds to the troops, especially in field service. The manner of distributing supplies.

The fitting up of vessels for transporting men and horses, and the arrangements for embarking and disembarking them.

The medical and hospital arrangements, both in permanent hospitals and in the field. The kind of ambulances of other means used for transporting the sick and wounded.

The kind of clothing and camp equipage used for service in the field.

The kinds of arms, ammunition, and accouterments used in equipping troops for the various branches of service, and their adaptation to the purpose intended. In this respect, the arms and equipments of cavalry of all kinds will claim your particular attention.

The practical advantages and disadvantages attending the use of various kinds of rifle arms which have been lately introduced extensively in European warfare.

The nature and efficiency of ordnance and ammunition employed for field and siege operations, and the practical effect of the late changes partially made in the French field artillery.

The construction of permanent fortifications, and the arrangement of new systems of sea-coast and land defenses, and the kinds of ordnance used in the armament of them—Lancaster gun and other rifle cannon, if any are used.

The composition of trains for siege operations, the kind and quantity of ordnance, the engineering operations of a siege in all its branches, both of attack and defense.

The composition of bridge trains, kinds of boats, wagons, etc.

The construction of casemated forts, and the effects produced on them in attacks by land and water.

The use of camel for transportation, and their adaptation to cold and mountainous countries.

To accomplish the objectives of your expedition most effectually in the shortest time, it appears to be advisable that you should proceed as soon as possible to the theater of war in the Crimea, for the purpose of observing the active operation in that quarter. You will then present yourselves to the commanders of the several armies and request from them such authority and facilities as they may be pleased to grant for enabling you to make the necessary observation and inquiries to proceed through Russia to St. Petersburg, with the view of visiting the works and seeing the operations which may be carried on in the Baltic. Should it not be possible or advisable to enter Russia in this way, you may be able to accomplish the same object by passing through Austria and Prussia. In returning from Russia, you will have the opportunity of seeing the military establishments of Prussia, Austria, France, and England.

(II)

The arrangements for your journey must be regulated in a general measure by the state of affairs existing on your arrival in Europe and the information you may acquire there.

Letters are herewith furnished to you for our Ministers in Europe, requesting them to afford you the aid in their power in accomplishing the object of your mission.

Funds for defraying the expenses your journey are placed in the hands of Major Mordecai, who will disburse and account for them. You are authorized to use a portion of these funds in purchasing for this department new books, drawings, and patterns of arms and equipments, which you may consider of sufficient value to our service to warrant the expenditure.

Reserving until you return to the United States a full account of our expedition and the information you may obtain, you will report to the Secretary of War from time to time, as opportunity may offer, the progress of your journey, and remarks on the subjects within the scope of your instructions and which you may wish to communicate.

All correspondence of this kind, proceeding either from the Commission jointly or from any member of it, will be forwarded, according to military usage and regulations, through the senior officer present.

It is desirable that you should return home by the 1st of November, 1855. If you should find it essential for effecting the objects of your mission in a satisfactory manner to remain longer than that time, you will report the circumstances, so as to give time for an answer, in due season.

Reliance is placed on your judgment and discretion to conduct your movements in such a manner as to give no reasonable ground for suspicion or offense to the military or other government authorities with whom you may have intercourse.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JEFFERSON DAVIS,

Secretary of War.

Source: Arthur Thomas Frame, *The U.S. military commission to the Crimean War and its influence on the U.S. Army before the American Civil War*, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 1993) 297-299. This letter was copied exactly as it appeared in the text.

NOTES

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, Washington, D.C: June 2000.

² Heath Twitchell, Jr. ALLEN The Biography of an Army Officer 1859-1930 (New Jersey: Rutgers University 1974), 176.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Jay Luvaas, "A Prussian Observer with Lee," Military Affairs, 21, no.3 (1957): 105.

⁵ Ibid, 116. Scheibert's comment on artillery and fortifications were more fruitful and useful to the Prussian military since this was the reason why he was originally sent.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Jim Pahriss, <PAHRIS@hqda.army.mil>, "MPEP, [E-mail to John Nutt, <nuttj@nwc.navy.mil>] Feb 2003. The information was provided in a Military Personnel Exchange Program slide presentation, slide 2, from the Strategic Leadership Division. Both McClellan and Delafield were part of a three man commission sent to observe the Crimean War. Delafield reports on the usefulness of the telegraph which helped create the Signal Corps.

⁸ Thomas Grodecki, Technical Report on Military Observers 1815–1975, (Alexandria, VA: Center of Military History 1988), 2. MAJ Grodecki published a list of over 2,000 military observers that had graduated from the U.S. Military Academy. The list is a comprehensive work which includes a biography of each officer and their contributions as observers.

⁹ W.J. Morrissey, The USMC Special Operations Capable (SOC) Concept: An Alternative Approach, 1992, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/MWJ.htm>> [01 February 2003].

¹⁰ Arthur Thomas Frame, The US Military Commission to the Crimean War and its Influence on the US Army before the American Civil War (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 1993), 281. In 1855, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis sent a three man commission to the Crimea in hopes of gathering solutions to the U.S. Army's problems of dealing with territorial expansion. Specifically, he looked towards Russia, who was facing many of the same dilemmas as the U.S.

¹¹ Joint Vision 2020.

¹² International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 2002 Chart of Armed Conflict (Washington, DC: 2002). The IISS further explains that although this group is capable of sustained operations, which at times spill over international borders, they are not considered international conflicts. This chart is an excellent source of information that graphically portrays historical and current information on international and internal conflicts.

¹³ Ibid. The chart also provides data on Multinational Peacekeeping Operations, estimated costs associated with armed conflict and the number of fatalities from 1945-1994.

¹⁴ John Pike, "Status-of-Forces Agreements," 08 September 2002, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sofa.htm>> [17 January 2003].

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Standing Rules of Engagement For US Forces, J-3 CJCSI 3121.01A DISTRIBUTION: A, C, S, (15 January 2000).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Maureen P. O'Connor, "The Vision of Soldiers: Britain, France, Germany and the United States Observe the Russo-Turkish War," War in History, 4 no.3 (1997): 265. "Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis sent a three man military commission to the Crimean War, to observe the employment of new technologies and equipment. All of the commissioner's reports provided valuable information that influenced the development of the United States Army before the out break of the Civil War." Nothing builds rapport faster than subjecting yourself to the same privations as your allies.

¹⁹ "Foreign Area Officer Program," 21 January 2002, <<http://www.fao.army.mil.htm>> [13 January 2003].

²⁰ The SFODA is trained to conduct one or more of its primary missions. These missions include: Unconventional Warfare, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, Foreign Internal Defense, Combating Terrorism, Counter Proliferation and Information Operations.

²¹ O'Connor, 264.

²² Alice Deery, "Naval Staff College Attendance Record for Allied Students 1972-2002:" (Unpublished Data, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 2002). This is a complete list of all the allied countries that have sent military officers to attend the Naval Staff College. This list does not include the current class in session.

²³ Pahriss, 2.

²⁴ Ibid. Douglas MacArthur was sent to work in Tokyo (1905-1906) where his father was America's official observer of Japan's military operations against Russia.

²⁵ William T. Coffey, Jr. Patriot Hearts (Colorado: Purple Mountain Publishing 2000), 353.

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